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Abstract
In this work we study older workers’ (50—64) labor force transitions after a health/disability
shock. We ﬁnd that the probability of keeping working decreases with both age and severity
of the shock. Moreover, we ﬁnd strong interactions between age and severity in the 50—64 age
range and none in the 30–49 age range. Regarding demographics we ﬁnd that being female
and married reduce the probability of keeping work. On the contrary, being main breadwinner,
education and skill levels increase it. Interestingly, the eﬀect of some demographics changes
its sign when we look at transitions from inactivity to work. This is the case of being married
or having a working spouse. Undoubtedly, leisure complementarities should play a role in the
latter case. Since the data we use contains a very detailed information on disabilities, we are
able to evaluate the marginal eﬀect of each type of disability either in the probability of keeping
working or in returning back to work. Some of these results may have strong policy implications.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Recent health related events such as the increase in life expectancy, advances in medicine and
technological improvements applied to the workplace, justify to study the decisions of returning
to job after a period of unemployment or inactivity (Gruber and Kubik [1], Currie and Madrian
[2], Kreider and Pepper [3], Williamsom and McNamara [4]). In this work we aim at studying the
labor force transitions of older workers motivated by a health shock, a sudden deterioration of their
health status that generates a disability (Walker and Thompson [5], Kidd et al. [6]).
The literature on the consequences of health shocks have focussed either on their eﬀects on
retirement (Tompa [7], Bound et al. [8], Blau and Gilleskie [9]), or their eﬀects on the relationship
between unemployment and retirement (Riphahn [10], Autor and Duggan [11], Wilkins [12]), or
their impact on labor earnings or wealth (Hum and Simpson [13], Hyatt [14], Ward-Batts [15],
Messer and Berger [16]). Characteristics such as health status, employment prospects, labor-force
attachment and income sources are investigated in order to develop a relationship between health
shock and labor force transitions, including labor force exit, job change and application for beneﬁts.
The Spanish literature on labor force transitions after a health shock is very scarce. García-
Gómez and López-Nicolas [17] constitutes the only attempt to speciﬁcally study the consequences
of a health shock on labor force status, using data from the European Community Household Panel
(ECHP) during the 1994—2001 period. They ﬁnd substantial labor supply eﬀects of health shocks,
proxying the health shock by a persistent deterioration of self-reported overall health status. As we
shall explain latter on, we use self-reported information on a large series of potential disabilities, in
contrast with the latter work. Other related studies worth to mention are Jiménez-Martín et al. [18]
who study transitions out of the labor force for all EU countries present in the ﬁrst three waves of the
ECHP, controlling for various health variables and, Jiménez-Martín et al. [19] who study award
errors in disability beneﬁt concession. In this last study, the authors construct an "exogenous"
deserving indicator in order to estimate awarding errors in disability beneﬁt concessions.
We study labor force transitions after a health/disability shock in the 50—64 age range and
conditional to the Spanish labor legislation. According to this legislation if a worker suﬀers a
health/disability shock s/he can remain working, become temporary disabled, or, alternatively, in
case s/he does not fulﬁll the necessary requirements, unemployed. Some time afterwards, at the
time of the interview, and always satisfying stationary conditions, the agent can be observed in one
of three states: working, unemployed or inactive. Consequently, we know the labor force status of
the individual in three moments in time: before the health shock, immediately after the shock, and
at the time of the interview, which corresponds with the date of the survey.
We propose a sequential logit model for the estimation of these transitions using data from
the Disabilities, Deﬁciencies and Health Status Survey (DDHSS from now on) carried out by the
Spanish Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) in 1999. The DDHSS is a large scale survey
(+207000 interviews) aimed at studying disabilities and dependency in Spain. This data source
has two main advantages: ﬁrst, the information about invalidity shocks is extremely detailed; and,
second, conditional on having a shock, we know the agent’s labor force status at three moments
in time. Using this data, the sequential model is estimated by maximum likelihood and validated
against a multinomial alternative.
We draw several interesting conclusions from our analysis. First, the negative eﬀect of the
severity of the shock in the probability of keeping work increases with age in the 50—64 age range.
This eﬀect is not observed for younger workers. This can be due to the fact that the pathways to
permanent disability and/or retirement increase as the individual gets older. Second, transitions
back to work, after a period out of employment, are uncommon and, more important, less frequent
as the individual ages. Third, there are notorious discrepancies in the marginal eﬀect on the
2probability of keeping work by disability type. Finally, if the individual deserves a disability
pension the probability of keeping work falls to zero.
The structure of the paper is the following: in section 2 we show some international evidence
about labor force status of disabled people. In section 3 we describe the beneﬁt programs available
to workers 50+. The econometric model is described in section 4. In section 5, we describe the
sample and the characteristics of the data, and, in section 6, we comment estimation results. In
section 7, we validate the model against a multinomial one, and evaluate its predictive accuracy.
Finally, we oﬀer some conclusions and tentative policy implications.
2 International comparison of disabled people
In this section we provide some evidence of the relative weight of disabled people from 50 to 64 years
old, over the whole society, working people and Social Security (SS) system. We have used data
from three surveys: ﬁrst, the 1999 wave of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP from
now on), that gathers information for all countries of the European Union with the exception of
Luxembourg; second, we use the Participation and Activity Limitation Survey (PALS) for Canada
during the year 2001; and, third, we use the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
corresponding to year 1997 for the United States. Despite the lack of homogeneity, we think that
we can get a reasonable picture about the issue.
In Table 1 we show the distribution of the 50—64 population for EU, Canada and the US by level
of disability. For EU countries, we use two questions from the ECHP: “Do you suﬀer any chronic
health problem, illness or mental or physical disability?”, and, for those answering aﬃrmatively
to the previous question “Does this health chronic problem, illness or disability prevents you from
doing daily living activities?”. Individuals may answer “yes, severely”, “yes, moderately” or “no”.
The Canadian PALS classiﬁcation, which is based in the WHO deﬁnition about disability, does not
distinguish between moderate or severe. In the case of the US the SIPP only diﬀerentiates between
severe and not severe disabilities. For a better understanding of the tables we denote with “S”
severe disability, with “M” moderate and with “N” none. Around 71% of the population of the
EU-14 between 50—64 years old do not suﬀer any disability, 19% declares a moderate disability and
only 10% a severe disability. Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain are the countries with less disabled
people.
Table 1: Distribution of the population by severity of the disability. Age 50—64
AU B D FI FR GE GR IR IT
Severe 6991 21 21 4 8 45
Moderate 19 12 24 31 14 39 12 15 10
None 75 79 67 57 74 47 80 81 85
N P SP SW UK EU CA USA
Severe 10 15 5 22 10 10 - 18
Moderate 21 20 17 17 18 19 22 11
None 69 65 78 61 72 71 78 71
Source: ECHP (1999). PALS (2001). SIPP (1997). We have used the following abbreviations: AU= Austria,
B= Belgium, D= Denmark, FI= Finland, FR= France, GE= Germany, GR= Greece, IR= Ireland, IT= Italy,
N= Netherlands, P= Portugal, SP= Spain, SW= Sweden, UK= United Kingdom, EU= European Union-14, CA=
Canada, USA= United States.
Table 2 presents a cross tabulation between level of disability and the highest level of education
achieved. It is diﬃcult to obtain a harmonized classiﬁcation because each country has its own
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ing, and for United States the denomination college includes also some college. This may explain
some discrepancies in the ﬁgures of severe or moderate disabled people who have completed college
education. Younger population has beneﬁted from social policies for raising education rates. Only
72% of severe disabled people have completed elementary education against 61% of those without
any disability. On the other hand, people with severe disabilities have less than half probability of
ﬁnishing college education in relation to healthy ones. In this sense, there may be a selection eﬀect,
because if disability appears during childhood it may constitute a problem to start or remain at
school, but also less educated people are more prone to suﬀer disabilities. For elementary education,
there is a gap of nearly twenty points between moderate (94%) and none disability (78%) for Spain
and Greece, and the proportion of severe or moderate people who have completed high school or
college is, in both cases, very low.
Table 2: Distribution of the population according to maximum level of education completed and
degree of disability. Age 50—64.
AU B D FI FR GE GR IR IT N P SP SW UK EU CA USA
Severe
College 1 12 11 10 7 13 4 5 0 5 2 3 11 22 7 - 32
H. School 50 36 39 29 3 57 2 18 11 2 2 2 45 14 21 - 33
Elementary 49 52 50 61 90 30 94 77 89 93 96 95 44 64 72 - 45
Moderate
College 2 20 17 22 10 17 2 7 4 6 2 2 21 39 12 35 51
H. School 61 31 46 28 5 54 4 20 14 3 3 4 41 14 25 17 20
Elementary 37 49 37 50 85 29 94 73 82 91 95 94 38 47 63 48 29
None
College 6 29 25 32 21 23 13 16 6 7 7 13 30 51 17 44 57
H. School 54 32 53 30 8 53 9 28 21 2 4 9 45 13 22 21 22
Elementary 40 39 22 38 71 24 78 56 73 91 89 78 25 36 61 35 21
Source: ECHP (1999). PALS (2001). SIPP (1997)
Table 3 describes employment rates by disability type. Diﬀerences across employment rates
may reveal the social integration degree of disabled people. Spain, Italy and Greece present the
lowest ﬁgures for severe disabled working people, and Spain the lowest rate of moderate disabled
working people. Even for healthy people, participation rates are in Spain lower than the average
for the EU (22% with respect to 52%). On the other hand, the US exhibits the greatest rates of
working population for both moderate disabled and healthy people.
In Table 4 we show the proportion of people receiving either any kind of disability or illness
beneﬁts, for the set of countries already mentioned. We have not found information about disability
beneﬁts for Canada, and the US information about SS beneﬁts was provided all together. Around
42% of severe disabled people receive a disability beneﬁti nt h eE U .H o w e v e r ,w eh a v et oc o n s i d e r
that they may receive other private earnings, spouse income or early retirement beneﬁts. The
highest rate of coverage corresponds to Finland followed by Denmark, United Kingdom and Spain.
On the other hand, Spain shows the highest fraction of moderate disabled people (31% compared
with 22% for the EU). This illustrates the fact, already mentioned by Boldrin et al. [20], that
disability beneﬁts have been used as a device to avoid unemployment for individuals approaching
retirement.
Summing up the evidence for Spain: there is a lower percentage of disabled people than in other
developed countries but, at the same time, disabled people present lower levels of education and
4Table 3: Employment rate by severity of the disability. Age 50—64.
AU B D FI FR GE GR IR IT
Severe 16 18 18 32 26 24 11 22 11
Moderate 22 24 49 44 33 36 20 25 25
None 25 24 49 45 39 40 24 27 19
N P SP SW UK EU CA USA
Severe 19 17 13 31 14 20 - 25
Moderate 29 31 15 62 32 40 27 55
None 29 40 22 65 44 40 56 71
Source: ECHP (1999). PALS (2001). SIPP (1997)
Table 4: Percentage of people receiving a disability/illness beneﬁt by severity of the disability. Age
50—64.
AU B D FI FR GE GR IR IT N P SP SW UK EU
Severe 34 63 71 73 31 23 26 50 49 47 35 69 51 69 42
Moderate 21 28 29 23 12 7 7 28 29 13 16 31 27 23 22
None 33 2 1 0 31 0224 525 2 3
Source: ECHP (1999).
participation rates, and greater probabilities of receiving a disability beneﬁt.
3 Public programs for old—age workers
Table 5 summarizes the programs available after or around age 50. Besides private pensions, there
are three other public programs that may aﬀect the behavior of old age workers: unemployment
beneﬁts, disability beneﬁts and retirement pensions. Both the unemployment and the disability
plans oﬀer a “pathway to early retirement” alternative to the normal one (with early retirement at
60 and normal retirement at 65).
Unemployment beneﬁts and subsidies
As many other countries, there is a contributory program to protect employees against a non-
voluntary unemployment spell. The duration of the beneﬁts range from 120 days for 360 days of
previous contribution to the system to 720 days for 2160+ days of contribution (in both cases the
days of contribution should be within the six years preceding the event). The beneﬁta m o u n ti s6 0
percent of the beneﬁt base —the average of the contributive bases during the 180 days preceding the
unemployment spell— during the ﬁrst 180 days and 60 percent of the beneﬁt base during the second
180 days. The minimum beneﬁt amount in 1999 was 418 euros. The maximum beneﬁta m o u n ti s
a function of the number of dependent children. Without children it amounts 875 euros. With 2+
children it amounts 1069 euros. Unemployment beneﬁts are subject to both SS contributions and
income tax.
There are two continuation programs for those who have exhausted their entitlement to contrib-
utory unemployment beneﬁts: one for those aged 45+ (UB45+ program) and the other for those
aged 52+ (UB52+ program). The latter plan is a special subsidy for unemployed people older than
52, who lack income sources (monthly income cannot exceed 75 of the monthly minimum wage),
5have contributed to unemployment insurance for at least 6 years in their life and, except for age,
satisfy all requirements for an old-age pension. The beneﬁta m o u n ti s7 5p e r c e n to ft h em o n t h l y
minimum wage. This type of beneﬁts can be drawn until the person reaches the early or normal
retirement age, whatever comes ﬁrst.
Disability beneﬁts
The SS system provides insurance against both temporary and permanent illness or disability.
Temporary illness or disability
The terms of provision of the subsidy for temporary illness or disability (incapacidad laboral transito-
ria) has undergone frequent changes. Eligibility requires aﬃliation to the SS system for a minimum
period that depends upon the nature of the covered risk. Common illness requires only 180 days
of contributions during the last 5 years, whereas no minimum eligibility criterion is imposed for
work-related accidents or illnesses.
The beneﬁt base depends on actual earnings during the last 12 months. In case of common
illness or work-unrelated accident, the subsidy is equal to 60 percent of the beneﬁtb a s ef o re a c hd a y
of absence between the 4-th and the 20-th, and to 75 percent of the beneﬁtb a s ea f t e r w a r d su n t i l
the maximum period is reached. The maximum period for which the subsidy can be received is
18 months, after which the worker must either return to work or, conditional on passing a medical
examination, be classiﬁed as “permanently disabled”.
Contributive disability pensions
Contributory disability beneﬁts (DI) are far more generous than any other old-age program, since
they are not subject to penalties for young age or insuﬃcient years of contribution. DI beneﬁts are
subject to approval by a medical examiner (notoriously, the tightness of the admissibility criteria
used by examiners varies both over time and across regions) and, since the early 1990s, they have
become harder to obtain at older ages. In fact, and contrary to the practice prevailing during the
1980s, it is now less common to access permanent DI beneﬁts after age 55. The total disability rate
(as a percent of the workforce) doubled in less than ten years, from about 0.7 percent in 1975 to
1.5 percent in 1983. The 1985 reform managed to bring the phenomenon under partial control by
tightening the requirements. Disability rates have since decreased, stabilizing around 0.6 percent.
Disability pensions are distinguished into contributory and non-contributory. Since our analysis
is conditional on working at the beginning of the period, we limit ourselves to the contributory
pensions. Eligibility and pension amounts depend on the level of disability. The 1985 reform
distinguished four levels of permanent disability characterized by increasing severity. Since then,
the legislation has formally reduced them to three, but it has also created a special subcase of the
ﬁrst level with the explicit purpose of using the disability funds to subsidize the dismissal of old
workers from certain sectors or geographical areas.
The ﬁrst level (incapacidad permanente total para la profesión habitual, or IPT) corresponds to
inability to do the usual job. A special subcase (incapacidad permanente total cualiﬁcada para la
profesión habitual, or IPTC) applies only to employees older than 55 which are in particular socio-
economic situations. The second level (incapacidad permanente absoluta, or IPA) corresponds
to inability to do any kind of job. The third level (gran invalidez, or GI) requires, in addition,
continued attendance by other persons in order to carry out the basic vital functions. In terms of
r e q u i r e m e n t s ,w h e nd i s a b i l i t yi sc a u s e db ya no r d i n a r yi l l n e s s ,e l i g i b i l i t yt oap e n s i o nr e q u i r e sf r o m
6Table 5: Public programs at older ages.
Unemployment Disability Social security
age insurance Insurance beneﬁts
50 cont. from 45+ cont. /non-cont. n.a.
52 cont. from 52+ cont. /non-cont. n.a.
55 cont. from 52+ cont. /non-cont. n.a.
60 cont. cont. /non-cont. ER(b):c o n t .
65 — — NR: cont./non-cont.
Keys: cont.: contributory; non-cont.: non contributory;
45+ and 52+: Special UI program for 45+ and 52+ workers enrolled in the RGSS.
ER: early retirement, NR: normal retirement.
(a). There are exceptions, allowing for retirement before 60.
5 to 15 years of contributions, depending on age. There is no contributive requirement when the
disability is caused by an accident, whether or not work-related, or a professional illness.
The beneﬁt base depends on the source of disability. In case of ordinary illness, it is computed
as for old-age pensions. For work-unrelated accident, it is the average annual wage over a period
of 24 consecutive months chosen by the person within the last 7 years of work. For work-related
accident or professional illness, it is the average wage in the last year of work. The pension equals
55 percent of the beneﬁt base under IPT, and increases to 75 percent under IPTC. In case of IPA,
it is equal to 100 of the beneﬁt base, whereas for GI it is equal to 100 percent of the beneﬁtb a s e
plus another 50 percent covering the person taking care of the disabled.
Retirement beneﬁts
The retirement program has two options: early retirement and normal retirement. Early retirement
is possible from age 60 but, by year 1999, it only applied to workers who started their contributive
career before 1967. The normal retirement age is 65, although some special professions have lower
normal retirement ages (miners, military personnel, policemen and ﬁs h e r m e na r et h em a i no n e s ) .
Collective wage settlements often impose mandatory retirement at age 65, facilitate retirement at
64 with full beneﬁts, or encourage retirement between 60 and 63 through lump sum amounts.
4E c o n o m e t r i c f r a m e w o r k
We consider the situation of an individual in three diﬀerent moments of time for which we have
information about labor force status. In period t0, the agent is working (W0)a n ds u ﬀers a
health/invalidity shock. This health shock may be a common or working disease or any type
of (traﬃc, working, household) accident. In period t1, immediately after the health shock, she
keeps working or not. In the latter case, she can be unemployed (U1) or temporarily disabled (I1).
The main distinction between the unemployed and temporal disability status is that for the
former case the contractual relation has ﬁnished and the agent has to look for a new job, whereas
for the latter the worker can return to the same job if she recovers. There are several reasons
for not receiving temporal disability beneﬁts. It may be because the health shock occurred before
7aﬃliation to SS, because the agent is not eligible for temporal disability, or because she prefers to
collect unemployment beneﬁts.
Some time afterwards, in period t2 (which corresponds to the time of the interview), she can
be working again or not. While unemployed she can go back to work (U1W2), remain unemployed
(U1U2) or make a transition to inactivity (U1I2). Alternatively, while temporarily disabled, the
individual can return to the previous job or move to another job (I1W2), make a transition to
unemployed (I1U2), or remain inactive (I1I2).
We can represent this situation using a sequential model in four steps, with six decision nodes
and seven terminal nodes (W1,U 1W2,U 1U2,U 1I2,I 1W2,I 1U2,I 1I2). Decision nodes correspond
to each one of the possible choices the agent faces, two in period t1 a n df o u ri np e r i o d t2. Picture
1 shows the structure of the sequential process. Due to data restrictions, we have to assume that
if the agent keeps working after the shock, at time t1, then she is also working at t2,t h a ti s
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Picture 1. Structure of the problem.
After shock Present
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the probability of an event in a given node is condi-
tionally independent of choices in previous nodes. So, we consider a sequential logit model in which
all decisions are conditionally independent series of binary choices (Amemiya [21]). When choosing
between working or not, we will assign the value 1 to the option of working, and when choosing
between unemployment and inactivity, we will assign the value 1 to the ﬁrst option. We consider
diﬀerent set of explanatory variables X1,X 2,Y 1,Y 2,Z 1,Z 2 with their corresponding coeﬃcient
vectors α, β, γ1, γ2, δ1, δ2. These sets of explanatory variables contain common variables to all of
them (sex, age, education, skill level, disabilities) and other variables speciﬁc to each decision node.
Using a logistic regression, the probability of continuing working at t1 conditional on having a
8health shock h0 at t0,i sg i v e nb y :
Pr[W1 =1 ]=F(α0X1) (1)
where F(s)=e x p ( s)/[1 + exp(s)] and, for the sake of simplicity we have skipped the conditioning
variables, h0 and W0. The probability of being unemployed at t1 is:
Pr[U1 =1 ]=P r [ W1 =0 ]P r [ U1 =1 |W1 =0 ]=[ 1− F(α0X1)]F(β0X) (2)
where Pr[U1 =1 |W1 =0 ]is the probability of becoming unemployed at t1 conditional on not being
working at t1. Following the same procedure, we compute the probability of being unemployed at
t1 and working at t2 :
Pr[U1W2 =1 ] = P r [ W1 =0 ]P r [ U1 =1 |W1 =0 ]P r [ W2 =1 |U1 =1 ,W 1 =0 ] (3)
=[ 1 − F(α0X1)]F(β0X2)F(γ0
1Y1)
or the probability of being unemployed at t1 and t2:
Pr[U1U2 =1 ] = P r [ W1 =0 ]P r [ U1 =1 |W1 =0 ] (4)
=P r [ W2 =0 |U1 =1 ,W 1 =0 ]Pr[U2 =1 |W2 =0 ,U 1 =1 ,W 1 =0 ]
=[ 1 − F(α0X1)]F(β0X2)[1 − F(γ0
1Y1)]F(δ0
1Z1)
Further, the probability of being in temporary disability at t1 a n dr e t u r n i n gt ow o r ka tt2 is:
Pr[I1W2 =1 ] = P r [ W1 =0 ]P r [ U1 =0 |W1 =0 ]P r [ W2 =1 |U1 =0 ,W 1 =0 ] (5)
=[ 1 − F(α0X1)][1 − F(β0X2)]F(γ0
2Y2)
and the probability of temporary disability at t1 and unemployed at t2 :
Pr[I1U2 =1 ] = P r [ W1 =0 ]P r [ U1 =0 |W1 =0 ] (6)
=P r [ W2 =0 |U1 =0 ,W 1 =0 ]P r [ U2 =1 |W2 =0 ,U 1 =0 ,W 1 =0 ]
=[ 1 − F(α0X1)][1 − F(β0X2)][1 − F(γ0
2Y2)]F(δ0
2Z2)
The sets of parameters α, β, γ1, γ2, δ1, δ2 are estimated sequentially over each of the survival
samples. Finally, the total probability of being working at the time of the interview (t2)i sg i v e n
by:
Pr[W2]=P r [ W1 =1 ]+P r [ U1W2 =1 ]+P r [ I1W2 =1 ] (7)
The proposed sequential model presents several advantages with respect to a multinomial one.
First, we use diﬀerent functions to estimate dependence across states. If workers could advance
the severity of the health shock at the beginning of t0 and how relation with economic activity
is going to be aﬀected, then a multinomial model would be more appropriate. However, workers
may face uncertainties and may change their mind (depending on the number of computed working
years, searching costs...). A second advantage is that is easier from a computational point of view,
because the likelihood function may be maximized over the base of the diﬀerent proposed stages
corresponding to each of the dichotomic alternatives (Amemiya [22]).
95D a t a
We use data from the DDHSS carried out by the INE during the second term of 1999 [microdata
website: http://www.ine.es/prodyser/micro_disca.htm]. The survey aims at identifying the actual
situation of individuals with disabilities. The main method to collect the information is personal
interview to all the members of the selected household. A sample of 70.402 households and 218,185
people were interviewed, from which 10,484 were less than 6 years old and 207,701 were 6 or more
years. The survey consist of four diﬀerent questionnaires: Household, Disabilities and Deﬁciencies
(+6years), Limitations and Impairment (-6years) and Health questionnaire. The key parts of the
survey for the purposes of this paper are the Household and Disabilities and Deﬁciencies (D&D)
questionnaires. The ﬁrst collects socioeconomic information for all household members.
Every respondent to the Household questionnaire is asked whether s/he suﬀers a disability,
that is, a limitation that prevents from doing daily living activities for more than one year. A
survey respondent is considered to be not disabled if she does not have any diﬃc u l t yi na c h i e v i n g
any of 36 daily living activities that have been detailed. An individual may perform an inﬁnite
number of activities, but for the purpose of this survey, only most common and basic daily living
activities are taken into account. The concept of disability tries to analyze if the individual is able
to perform a determined activity independently of whether she really practices it or not. Those
answering aﬃrmatively have to complete the D&D questionnaire, which includes questions about
severity, forecast, origin, duration and age at the onset of the disability. It also contains questions
concerning the impact of the disability on labor force status. The same person may suﬀer two or
more disabilities that may be independent among each other (originated by diﬀerent deﬁciencies),
or they may be caused by the same problem. This survey gathers all disabilities suﬀered by the
same respondent.
The variable severity tries to measure the degree of diﬃculty for performing each of the activities.
It can take four values (Si,i=1 ,..,4): without diﬃculty, moderate diﬃculty, severe diﬃculty and
cannot do the activity. The variable forecast tries to capture what may be the future evolution
of the disability. It can take ﬁve diﬀerent values (Fj,j =1 ,..5): recoverable, recoverable with
restrictions, stable without perspectives of improvement, can go worse and it is not possible to
determine.
Answers to the D&D questionnaire are based on the individual’s subjective perception about
his own limitations. Several authors pointed out that there is not evidence of systematic errors
in respondent answers. They sustain that self-reported measures are a trustworthy indicator of
health status, and may be considered as a ﬁrst approximation to true disability status (Nagi [23],
Stern [24], Dwyer and Mitchell [25], Benítez-Silva et al. [26]).This result is strengthened by the
conﬁdentiality of the responses, because individuals do not have incentives to missreport in order
to increase the probability of receiving any kind of SS beneﬁt.
Finally, the Health questionnaire selects randomly one member from each household no matter
she is aﬀected or not by some disability. It contains interesting information about body mass
index, habits and addictions. Unfortunately, only 12 percent of the sample have answered both the
D&D and Health questionnaires. This implies that if we select those aged between 50 and 64 who
completed the D&D and Health questionnaire, the size of the sample is much more smaller than
the one we would obtain in the next section (intuitively, the sample of respondents to both will be
the product of the probability of having a disability times the inverse of the household size times
the total sample size).
105.1 Design of the various samples
The initial sample is composed by people who answered the D&D questionnaire. There are 19.890
observations (8.405 men and 11.485 women). Then, we have followed these steps:
1. First, we select individuals who have answered “yes” to the question “have you changed rela-
tion with economic activity as a consequence of a disability?” (sample 1: 3.620 observations).
We drop those not working at the time of the health shock using the question “which was
your relation with economic activity before disability?” and get a sample of 585 observations.
2. We also select people who suﬀered a health shock but continued working, that is, have com-
pleted the D&D questionnaire but answered “no” to the question “have you changed relation
with economic activity as a consequence of a disability”(sample 2: 1.837 observations).
3. We drop observations corresponding to individuals younger than 50 years old (1.573 observa-
tions) or older than 64 years old (1.213 observations) and obtain sample 3 (2.086 observations).
4. To determine whether people were unemployed or receiving temporal disability just after the
health shock (t1), we use the question “which was your relation with economic activity after
disability?”.
5. To determine whether people returned to work or remained inactive or unemployed at the
time of the survey (t2), we use the question “which is your present relation with economic
activity?”
6. We restrict the interval between period t0 and t2 to a span of three years (see next section
for further description). For the rest of the paper we use this ﬁnal sample (sample 4)o f
1.587 observations. Time t2 corresponds to time of the interview, when respondents are
asked “which is your present relation with economic activity”. The structure of sample 4 is
described in Picture 2 (size of sample 3 in brackets).
In order to compare the eﬀect of a health shock on labor force status across the life cycle, we
have selected a sample for respondents between 30 to 49 years old following the same steps above.
There are 1,392 respondents to the D&D questionnaire aged 30-49 years, from which 851 continued
working after health shock, 66 became unemployed and 475 moved to temporal disability. If we
apply the three years criterion to restrict time interval from t0 to t2, there is a ﬁnal sample of 980
observations (W1 is equal to 511, U1 is 52 and I1 is 417).
5.2 Interval between the health shock and the time of the interview (present)
It is clear that the interval between period t0 and t2 cannot not be left unrestricted. If it were too
short the agent could not have enough time to get recovered, but if it were too long then labor
force status might be inﬂuenced by other factors rather than the health shock at time t0. To set the
most appropriate length, we have considered the periods of elegibility to either unemployment or
temporary disability beneﬁts the individual is entitled while out of employment. The unemployment
beneﬁt may last a maximum of 720 days if the period of contributions is greater or equal than 2.160
days. Once unemployment beneﬁth a sﬁnished, worker may still receive a UB+52 if he fullﬁls the
requirements. Obviously, the receipt of any kind of subsidy will inﬂuence the incentives to ﬁnd a
new job. The temporary disability beneﬁt may last a maximum of 18 months with an extension of
12 months if the medical treatment recommends so.
11For every respondent to the DDHSS we know the age at the time of the interview (t2), and for
any respondent of the D&D questionnaire we know how many disabilities does she suﬀer and how
old was she at the onset of the disability. We also know which disability was the responsible for
a change in relation with economic activity. Combining this information we obtain how old the
worker was at the time of the health shock (t0).
Since we only know the age in years of the agent, we have rounded the 30 months and consider
a maximum interval of three years between health shock and time of the interview. Table 6 shows
the number of available observations after imposing the restriction between t0 and t2.I n e i t h e r













































































Picture 2. Structure of the sample.
After shock Present
For more than three fourths of the sample only three years since the health shock have passed.
Moreover, if we go back in time there are no signiﬁcant variations in W1 or U1,a n do n l yI1 grows
as the interval gets larger (the detailed ﬁgures are available upon request). Thus, the gain in the
number of observations does not compensate the eﬃciency loss derived by mixing eﬀects of the
original health shock with other disabilities that could arise afterwards.
5.3 Variable description and descriptive analysis
Appendix A contains a detailed description of the survey and variables employed in the analysis.
In Table B.1 of Appendix B we show descriptive statistics by transition type for the key variables
employed. In Table B.2 we make evident that there are some disabilities that do not prevent from
working. For example: seeing any image, global visual tasks, other visual disabilities (night vision,
colors diﬀerentiation), hearing any sound, hearing strong sounds, listening the speech, communi-
12Table 6: years between the health shock and the time of the interview. Cumulative percentage of
sample 3 in brackets
Y e a r s 12345
observations 857(41.08) 1297(62.12) 1587(76.08) 1619(77.61) 1669(80.01)
W1 318(37.11) 454(35.00) 545(34.34) 552(34.10) 569(34.10)
U1 26(3.03) 40(3.08) 49(3.09) 49(3.02) 52(3.12)
I1 513(59.86) 803(61.92) 993(62.57) 1018(62.88) 1048(62.78)
Y e a r s 6789 1 0
observations 1668(80.92) 1706(81.78) 1713(82.12) 1725(82.69) 1750(83.89)
W1 576(34.53) 581(34.06) 583(34.03) 587(34.03) 594(33.94)
U1 52(3.12) 53(3.11) 53(3.10) 54(3.13) 56(3.20)
I1 1060(62.35) 1072(62.83) 1077(62.87) 1084(62.84) 1100(62.86)
Y e a r s 1 11 21 31 41 5
observations 1766(84.66) 1778(85.23) 1791(85.86) 1801(86.34) 1824(87.44)
W1 600(33.98) 605(34.03) 608(33.95) 613(34.04) 624(34.21)
U1 57(3.23) 57(3.21) 57(3.18) 57(3.16) 57(3.13)
I1 1109(62.79) 1116(62.76) 1126(62.87) 1131(62.80) 1143(62.66)
cating through speech. This may be due to the great development of communication, information
and signposting technologies.
Common disabilities among unemployed are: manipulating small objects, moving without mean
of transport, moving in public transport, driving own vehicle and relating at job. Workers who have
move to temporal disability usually suﬀer disabilities for driving own vehicle, moving not heavy
objects, shopping, cooking, washing and ironing clothes. Although there are U1U2 individuals with
disabilities for using utensils and tools, washing oneself, eating and drinking, cleaning the house
and washing clothes, those who went to temporal disability because of the same health problems,
returned to work (I1W2) or remained inactive (I1I2) at time t2. This may be related to the fact that
for the case of temporary disability, the worker can return to the same job, or alternatively s/he
can apply for permanent disability beneﬁts. Alternative, unemployed’s options are less favorable:
the probability of ﬁnding a new job is very low and retirement is conditional on meeting elegibility
requirements (age above 60 and number of years contributed greater than 15, see [20] for a complete
description).
In Table B.3 we have combined the variables severity (Si,i=1 ,..,4) ,a n df o r e c a s t(Fj,j=1 ,..5)
of the disability. In both cases higher indexes imply worse diagnosis after the health shock. We
observe that severity S1 only appears for individuals who continue working after the health shock.
On the contrary, there is nobody with the highest degree of severity (S4) who has continued working
or has returned to work after unemployment or temporal disability. The combination S2P3 groups
the highest percentage of workers who have returned to job after health shock (61.11%) and severe
disability and unfavorable forecast (S3F4) gather most of the workers that are inactive at time t2
(47.06% of U1I2 and 35.26% of I1I2). In order to account for the impact of severity, and forecast
of the disability on the labor force status, in our the estimation exercise we have deﬁned three
binary variables: “severe disability”, “very severe disability” and “disability beneﬁt (DB) deserving
indicator”. Mean tests comparing pairwise subsamples of severe disabilities, very severe disabilities,
disabilities that deserve a DB or neither one, make evident that we reject the null hypothesis of
equal means for any two groups considered.
13The following table describes the construction of these variables. For the DB deserving indicator
we have used the results obtained by Jiménez-Martín et al. [19]. They proposed six diﬀerent criteria
using information from the DDHSS to check which one was the best in replicating the legal standard
of SS for deserving a permanent disability beneﬁt. They wanted to obtain an indicator of what
would have decided SS if it had had complete information from the applicant, in order to quantify
how many people receives a permanent disability beneﬁt but does not deserve it. For this purpose,
they used a battery of exogeneity, consistency and rational expectation tests and concluded that
the most appropriate indicator was the one described below.
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6R e s u l t s
6.1 Probability of continuing working or becoming unemployed after the shock
In Table B.4 we present computed predicted probabilities and marginal eﬀects using sample 4 for
a baseline case with the following characteristics: male, aged 50—54 years old, with elementary
education, skilled occupation, and without any severe disability. Estimated coeﬃcients and t-
statistics of the sequential logit model are available upon request.
The probability of keeping working for the base case is very high, 82.3%. Being female, or
married, or having a working spouse mildly reduce it, whereas having a retired spouse or collecting
DB or having to change house strongly reduce it. Alternatively, being main breadwinner, educated
or white collar worker signiﬁcantly increase the probability. Figure 1 shows the probability of
continuing working after a health shock by age and gender. The probability decreases with age,
with a peak around the age of early retirement (60 years old). The probability is higher for men
than for women, which may be due to diﬀerent family roles for husbands and wives, and possibly,
to lower replacement rates for women. Analysis of disability characteristics shows that adverse
eﬀects on labor force status are increasing in the severity of the disability and are also worse for
those who experience disability onset at older ages.
All variables related to disability reduce the probability signiﬁcantly, being the eﬀect of the
deserving indicator the strongest one (-46.1 %). Apart from this, the most important disabilities
that prevent continuing working are: moving outside home (-27.5%), executing orders (-24.1%),
taking care of oneself (-18.3%), doing housework (-16.6%), relating (-16.4%) and seeing (-15.6%).
The probability of becoming unemployed conditional on not being working after a health shock
is 12.46% (unconditionally 2.2%), which implies that the probability of being inactive is 87.5%
(unconditionally 15.5%). Most of the demographics reduce the conditional probability of becoming
14unemployed and, thus, increase the probability of being inactive. In fact it only increases for
unskilled workers and those without any schooling. Most likely this is so because their beneﬁt
while unemployed can be higher than their beneﬁt while in temporary disability. Figure 2 shows
the conditional probability of becoming unemployed by age and gender. We observe a decreasing
trend for both gender with a peak at 52 (onset of the unemployment subsidy for workers older
than 52, UB52+) and another speciﬁc for men at the age of 57 (although not as signiﬁcant as
the previous one). Part of the decay from age 58 onwards may be assumed due to transitions to
retirement.
Regarding the eﬀect of disability variables, most of them reduce the conditional probability of
becoming unemployed. In particular the eﬀects of the very severe (-65.1%), deserving indicator
(-80.2%), and impairment certiﬁcate (-64.7%) are very strong. However, we ﬁnd some exceptions:
having received a rehabilitation treatment increases the probability of falling into unemployment
by 39.1%. Further, not being able to move outside home increase this probability by 62.3%, using
hands and ﬁngers by 58.78%, doing housework by 31.8% and maintaining body postures by 30.4%.
It seems that individuals with disabilities concerning the locomotive system are more likely to
turn into unemployment than those with disabilities aﬀecting the sight, ear or nervous system
(remembering, recognizing, executing orders, relating). These results are likely to be related to
t h et y p eo fw o r k .W h i t ec o l l a rw o r k e r su s u a l l y perform sedentary tasks with low risks of suﬀering
work accidents, whereas skilled and unskilled workers develop a great number of displacements and
are more exposed to accidents of diverse consideration (manipulation of machinery, buildings in
construction, toxic substances, slightly healthy environments as the mining basins, etc.).
In what follows we are going to analyze in greater detail how these probabilities relate to
severity. In this sense Table 8 shows the probability of continuing working or becoming unemployed
conditional on not working at t1 (in brackets) by severity of the disability and age group. We
include the corresponding ﬁgures for prime age individuals for comparison purposes. For a given
age, the more severe is the disability the lower is the probability of remaining working or moving
to unemployment. The same happens for any degree of severity as the agent ages. In order to
make more evident the eﬀect of aging we present the same concepts but for prime age individuals
(30—49) in panel B, where the eﬀect of age and severity are less evident. The results are obtained
from a sequential logit model for labor force transitions of individuals 30—49, and are available on
request.
In order to add further evidence to the cross-eﬀect of age and severity, we have decomposed their
inﬂuence on the transition probabilities, in three parts: age eﬀect, disability eﬀect and interaction
between age and severity (see Table 9). As expected, both eﬀects are negative and increasing
with age or severity of disability. However, the most surprising result is that the interaction
is negative and signiﬁcant. This may indicates that the decrease in the probability of continuing
working (becoming unemployed) is greater (in absolute value) than the sum of the age and disability
eﬀects. This interaction is pushing further older workers out of the labor market. In contrast, the
interaction eﬀects for prime age workers (30—49) are almost negligible. The existence of various
permanent beneﬁt programs for older workers could explain this sharp discrepancy.
To conclude this section we study the shape of period 1 transition probabilities by age group and
education and skill levels (see Table 10). Cells corresponding to combinations no schooling-white
collar, no schooling-skilled and elementary schooling-skilled are empty because there is not enough
sample in such situations. For a given level of education (skill) we ﬁnd a positive (and increasing
with age) correlation between the probability of continuing working and the skill level (education).
On the contrary, as education (skill level) increases, maintaining the same level of skill (education),
the probability of being unemployed decreases. Finally, for a given level of skill and education both
probabilities fall with age, being the decrease greater for less educated groups.
15Table 8: Probability of continuing working or becoming unemployed= (in brackets) after a health
shock by severity of the disability.
Panel A: Older workers: 50—64
Disability 50—54 55—59 60—64
Not severe 0.7972 (0.1480) 0.7677 (0.1268) 0.6454 (0.1094)
Severe 0.6919 (0.1037) 0.6398 (0.0734) 0.3847 (0.0522)
Very severe 0.4301 (0.0861) 0.2132 (0.0426) 0.0576 (0.0134)
Panel B: Prime age workers: 30—49
Disability 30—34 35—39 40—44 45—49
Not severe 0.9297 (0.2414) 0.9153 (0.1777) 0.8971 (0.1563) 0.8086 (0.1499)
Severe 0.8074 (0.2077) 0.7902 (0.1417) 0.7728 (0.1205) 0.6985 (0.1139)
Very severe 0.5790 (0.1830) 0.5578 (0.1190) 0.5439 (0.0978) 0.4397 (0.0905)
=: conditional to not being working in t1.
Table 9: Marginal eﬀect of age, severity and their interaction on the prob. of continuing working
(Pr[W1]) and the prob. of becoming unemployed conditional on leaving employment (Pr[U1|NW1]).
Sample 50—64 Sample 30—49
Pr[W1 ] Pr[U1|NW1] Pr[W1 ] Pr[U1|NW1]
AGE EFFECT AGE EFFECT
From 50—54 to 55—59 -3.70 -14.32 -1.55 -26.38 From 30—34 to 35—39
From 50—54 to 60—64 -19.00 -26.08 -3.51 -32.25 From 35—39 to 40—44
– – – -14.84 -37.90 From 40—44 to 45—49
DISABILITY EFFECT DISABILITY EFFECT
From not severe to severe -13.21 -29.93 -13.15 -14.78 Not severe to severe
From not severe to very severe -46.05 -41.82 -37.72 -24.19 Severe to very severe
INTERACTION EFFECT INTERACTION EFFECT
Severe & 55—59 -2.83 -6.16 -0.30 -0.14 Severe & 35—39
Severe & 60—64 -19.53 -8.72 -0.22 -0.05 Severe & 40—44
– – -0.11 -0.14 Severe & 45—49
Very severe & 55—59 -23.51 -15.08 -0.73 -0.13 Very severe & 35—39
Very severe & 60—64 -27.72 -23.05 -0.27 -0.05 Very severe & 40—44
– -0.14 -0.42 Very severe & 45—49
16Table 10: Probability of continuing working or becoming unemployed= (in brackets) after a health
shock by age, skill and education levels
L e v e lo fE d u c a t i o n
Skill level College High School Elementary No Schooling
Age 50—54
Unskilled 0.6075 (0.1911) 0.5521 (0.2138) 0.5357 (0.2606) 0.4530 (0.2787)
Skilled 0.8423 (0.1048) 0.8097 (0.1183) 0.7946 (0.1477)
White Collar 0.9002 (0.0745) 0.8843 (0.0856)
Age 55-60
Unskilled 0.5611 (0.1274) 0.5075 (0.1440) 0.5130 (0.1782) 0.4110 (0.1835)
Skilled 0.8125 (0.0673) 0.7761 (0.0767) 0.7633 (0.0970)
White Collar 0.8867 (0.0476) 0.8645 (0.0545)
Age 60-65
Unskilled 0.4285 (0.0792) 0.3767 (0.0901) 0.3584 (0.1135) 0.2902 (0.1222)
Skilled 0.7157 (0.0408) 0.6705 (0.0463) 0.6532 (0.0595)
White Collar 0.8143 (0.0286) 0.7887 (0.0329)
=: conditional to not being working in t1.
6.2 Labor force transitions at t2
In this section we study transitions at period t2. The main results from the analysis are presented
in Table B.4. In all cases we consider the same baseline case than in the previous section. We
present two types of results. First, transitions conditional on being unemployed at t1. Second,
transitions conditional on having temporal disability at t1.
T h ep r o b a b i l i t yo fr e m a i n i n gu n e m p l o y e df o rt h eb a s ec a s ei sa l s ov e r yh i g h( 7 1% ) .I ti n c r e a s e s
for those having a working spouse, those having elementary or no schooling and for unskilled.
Alternatively, it decreases signiﬁcantly with age, for women, those married, and breadwinners
individuals. In fact, it is very interesting to notice that the probability of remaining unemployed
(U1U2) decreases 44.09% for women. Our data indicates that they move to inactivity without
receiving beneﬁts, specially when the requirements for early retirement are not fulﬁlled.
The probability of ﬁnding a new job after a period of unemployment is 10.25% and it only
increases for blue collar workers or for individuals w h o s es p o u s ei sw o r k i n g .I td e c r e a s e si na l lo t h e r
cases except for maintaining body postures,w h o s ec o e ﬃcient is not signiﬁcant.
Concerning severity variables or the deserving indicator (or even the impairment certiﬁcate
variable) the probabilities decrease substantially, which means that the probability of observing a
transition to inactivity greatly increases with severity. Surprisingly, we ﬁnd some disabilities that
increase the probability of remaining unemployed (maintaining body postures, using hand and
ﬁngers, moving outside home).
In Figures 3 and 5 we present the conditional probabilities of remaining unemployed and moving
to work by age, gender and severity of the shock, respectively. Figure 3 reveals that the probability
of continuing unemployed is around 80% for men and 60% for women both with non-severe disabil-
ities at age 50. It decreases with severity and age (mildly up to age 57 and steeper since this age)
as a consequence of transition to inactivity, taking advantage of the increasing generosity with age
of the Spanish beneﬁt system.
Figure 5 shows the conditional probability of being working after a period of unemployment.
17In this case we only present results for men because of lack of data for women. The probabilities
decrease signiﬁcantly with age. Moreover, we detect huge diﬀerences in the probabilities by level
of severity. For instance, for individuals around 50, that have suﬀered a moderate disability shock,
the probability of ﬁnding a new job is around 20 percent (with is not much lower than for the
overall population). This probability reduces to half for individuals with severe disability shocks
and goes practically to zero for individuals with very severe disability shocks.
Figures 4 and 6 show the same probabilities than Figures 3 and 5, respectively but by time out
of work and age. The longer the time passed after the shock and leaving employment the lower
the probability of ﬁnding a new job. Apart from this, the probability of remaining unemployed
decreases quickly for those out of work for a long time period. This may be due to the joint inﬂuence
of early retirement beneﬁts and lower unemployment subsidies for older workers.
The probability of returning to work after a period of inactivity is, for the base case, small (6.1
%). It increases for married, those having a working spouse, having a blue collar job or following
a rehabilitation treatment. It decreases strongly with age for women with very severe disabilities,
for individuals that deserve a DB, and, with all the disabilities. Specially interesting in this case
are the strong marginal eﬀects of the married and spouse working variables. The decrease in the
probability for the case of women is very high (-52.32%). Despite the fact that the previous job
is reserved until individual recovers from the health shock, it seems that women have much more
diﬃculties in returning to job. This may constitute evidence of discrimination against women.
Non-contributive disability beneﬁts, early retirement and houseworking are the main exits from
the labor market for women. This result is corroborated by other studies ([12], [13]
The analysis of the spouse labor force status shows that the probability of the worker returning
to employment is much higher if the spouse is employed. Similarly, the individual is much more
likely to become inactive if the spouse is retired or is receiving a disability beneﬁt. As in Jiménez-
Martín et al. [18] and Riphahn [10], both ﬁndings indicate strong complementarities in leisure of
both members of the couple. However, this is also compatible with the exit of the spouse from the
labor market for caring the disabled individual.
Suﬀering a very severe disability that satisﬁes the deserving indicator for DB reduces the prob-
ability of ﬁnding/returning to work at t2 (-80.14% and -87.34%) and the probability of going to
unemployment (-95.34% and -93.50%). Most workers who satisfy the deserving indicator for DB
apply for contributive (or non contributive) permanent disability beneﬁts for the case of I1,U 1,
respectively.
Table 11 shows the probability of returning to job by skill level, education and age group. A
few clear patterns arise: ﬁrst, the probability of returning to job increases with the level of skills
regardless of the age group; second, the level of education hardly inﬂuences the probability of
returning to work; and, third, for given skill and education levels, the probability decreases with
age.
Figure 7 shows that for a given level of severity the conditional probability of returning to work
after a period of inactivity is twice for men than for women at 50. From 61 onwards, the decrease
is sharper for men, possibly due to the eligibility rules to early retirement. Application for early
retirement beneﬁts is conditional on contributions to SS before 1967, which is much more likely to
occur for men (Boldrin et al. [20]). Figure 8 pictures the probability of returning to work by age
and time out of work. At the age of 50, this probability is equal to 32%, 21% and 14% if the health
shock happened within one year, between 1 and 2 years or between 2 and 3 years prior to the time
of the interview, respectively. From 60 years on, the gap between the respective probabilities is
reduced due to early retirement beneﬁts.
18Table 11: Probability of working in t2 after being in temporary disability in t1
L e v e lo fE d u c a t i o n
Skill level College High School Elementary No Schooling
Age 50—54
Unskilled 0.0180 0.0193 0.0207 0.02011
Skilled 0.0458 0.0479 0.0536
White Collar 0.0845 0.0881
Age 55-59
Unskilled 0.0117 0.0122 0.0137 0.0141
Skilled 0.0301 0.0314 0.0353
White Collar 0.0560 0.0582
Age 60-64
Unskilled 0.0028 0.0030 0.0032 0.0038
Skilled 0.0075 0.0079 0.0089
White Collar 0.0144 0.0149
6.3 Impact of explanatory variables over the ﬁnal probability of being working
Suppose we want to estimate the impact of the variable ξi (belonging to any of the matrices W, X,
Y1, Y2) over probability of being working at the ﬁnal stage. Then, we are interested in computing
∂ Pr[W2|ξ]/∂ξj. We can estimate it by maximum likelihood and get estimates of F(ˆ α0W),F(ˆ β0X),
F(ˆ γ0
1Y1) and F(ˆ γ0
2Y2). Using (7) and assuming a logistic distribution for each F0s, we obtain the
partial derivative with respect to ξj:
∂ Pr[ ˆ O2|ξ]
∂ξj
=ˆ αj[1 − F(ˆ α0X1)] ˆ P1 ++ [− ˆ αjF(ˆ α0X1) − ˆ βj[1 − F(ˆ β0X)] (8)
+ˆ γ1i[1 − F(ˆ γ0
1Y1)]] ˆ P2 +[− ˆ αjF(ˆ α0X1) − ˆ βjF(ˆ β0X)+ˆ γ2i[1 − F(ˆ γ0
2Y2)]] ˆ P3
where ˆ P1 =P r [ W1 =1 ] , ˆ P2 =P r [ U1W2 =1 ]and ˆ P3 =P r [ I1W2 =1 ] . We use a Taylor expansion
to compute standard errors because (8) contains products of functions that are correlated among
them. For example, ˆ αjF(ˆ α0W) appears in the right side of (8) and may be approximated as:
ˆ αjF(ˆ α0X1) ≈ αjF(α0 ¯ X1)+
∂αjF(α0 ¯ X1)
∂α
(ˆ αj − αj) (9)
= αjF(α0 ¯ X1)+F(α0
j ¯ X1)(ˆ αj − αj)+




(ˆ αj − αj)
= αjF(α0 ¯ X1)+ˆ αjF(ˆ α0 ¯ X1)(1 − F(α0 ¯ X1)) ¯ X1(ˆ αj − αj)+F(α0
j ¯ X1)(ˆ αj − αj)
where ¯ X1 is the mean of W,and αj and ˆ αj are the true and estimated coeﬃcients of the equation,
respectively. Then:
ˆ αjF(ˆ α0X1) − αjF(α0 ¯ X1) ≈ [ˆ αjF(α0 ¯ X1)(1 − F(α0 ¯ X1)) ¯ X1 +( 0 ,...,F(α0 ¯ X1),...,0)](ˆ αj − αj)
=⇒ ˆ αjF(ˆ α0X1) − αjF(α0 ¯ X1) ≈ C0(ˆ αj − αj)
19where C0 is a row vector that gathers the expression in brackets in the right side of equation
(9). If we assume that the estimated coeﬃcients from regressions are independent among them,
the asymptotic variance of
∂ Pr[W2|X]
∂Xj may be obtained by a repeated use of a Taylor expansion [the





0E(avar(ˆ α))d0 + d0
1E(avar(ˆ β))d1 + d0
2E(avar(ˆ γ1))d2 + d0
3E(avar(ˆ γ2))d3
where d0, d1, d2 and d3 are column vectors.
In the sequential model we have implicitly assumed that F(α0X1),F (β0X2),F (γ0
1Y1) and
F(γ0
2Y2) are mutually independent. The independence assumption of Pr[U1W2 =1 ]and Pr[I1W2 =
1] with respect to Pr[W1 =1 ]is the main disadvantage of this model. This may be due to the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity that has not been taken into account by the sequential model.
Heckman and Willis [27] study the problem of heterogeneity in the context of labor supply of mar-
ried women. They realize that there may be unobserved characteristics of single women that make
them diﬀerent from married ones, so unobserved eﬀects cause biased estimates. We assume that
controlling the initial labor force status, marital status, level of education, disabilities and other
health variables is enough to control for the heterogeneity problem.
The results of our exercise as well as predicted probabilities for variation with respect to a
base case are reported in Table B.5. All marginal eﬀects are signiﬁcant at standard levels. As
expected, having any kind of disability contributes to a signiﬁcant decrease in the probability of
being working at period t2, being the eﬀect of the severity and deserving indicators the stronger
ones. Regarding the eﬀect of demographics, being women or having a retired spouse decrease
signiﬁcantly the probability of being working at t2. Alternatively, having a working spouse, being
breadwinner, younger, and the level of skill or education increase it. The increase (drop) in the
probability that causes having a working spouse (spouse retired/DB ) is particularly relevant. It
evidences complementarities in leisure between both members of the couple. However, we must be
cautious with the eﬀect of this variable because of potential endogeneity problems.
Finally, Figure 9 further explores diﬀerences in the probabilities of being working at period t2
by gender, skill level and age group. We appreciate that the higher the professional status, the
greater the probability of being working, for all age brackets. Moreover, the probability decreases
with age, regardless the professional status.
7 Validation and forecast
7.1 Validation of the model
Our aim in this section is to test the sequential structure of the model against a multinomial
alternative. In estimating the sequential model, we have assumed that after suﬀering the health
shock at time t1, the agent may continue working W1 or not NW1. In this latter case, she could turn
to a situation of unemployment U1 or temporary disability I1. Going to one of the two alternatives
depends on the fulﬁllment of some legal requirements. Alternatively, we could have supposed that
alternatives W1,U 1 and I1 are simultaneous because the worker has not enough information about
the consequences of stopping work. Further, in estimating the sequential model at time t2,w ea r e
also assuming that individual considers monetary incentives and leisure preferences when deciding
whether working W2 or not NW2, and if she is not working, then she chooses the best alternative
between unemployment U2 and inactivity I2. But, again, the agent may also consider W2,U 2,I 2
simultaneously.
20In order to discriminate between both models we use three tests with the only diﬀerence among
them in the initial conditions (see Picture 3 below). The ﬁrst one, corresponds to period 0 where
all agents are working and suﬀer the health shock. In the second one, we focus on individuals that
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Picture 3. Sequential vs simultaneous decision process
To test these hypotheses we build a general model and we nest on it the restricted ones. Let’s











NW + wNW + U00
U|NW + wU|NW = U00




NW + wNW + U00
I|NW + wI|NW = U00
NW + wNW + y∗
I|NW
where y. represents indirect utility associated to all possible alternatives and wW,w U|NW and
wI|NW are independent errors with a type I extreme value distribution. We suppose that wNW
is distributed according to a generalization of a type I extreme value distribution. For further
discussion about wNW see van Ophem and Schram [28]. The indirect utility of the non-working
option (NW) is a linear combination of the utility derived from the option NW per se and utilities
associated to states U and I, with λ ∈ [0,1]. This nested model is diﬀerent from the traditional
one (Maddala [29], Amemiya [21]) because the underlying decision process considers the possibility
of a sequential model. In fact, λ may be interpreted as a measure of the degree of simultaneity.
Depending on the value of λ we may distinguish four cases:
1. λ =0 : we obtain a sequential model because the indirect utility from NW is composed by











and vW = wW,v j = wNW + wj|NW, j = U,I.
2. λ =1 : the model simpliﬁes to the simultaneous one and the choice of NW is determined
by maximum utility between U and I, with UW = U
00





εW = wW, εj = wNW + wj|NW, j = U,I.
3. λ ∈ (0,1): y∗
NW is determined by characteristics of U and I.
214. λ > 1 or λ < 0: there is no economic interpretation. However, values 0 and 1 are not in the
boundary of the parameter space and so, t-statistics computed are still valid.
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When estimating the model we assume that indirect utilities are linear and depend on a constant













where Vi =l o g [ e x p ( X0
iγ)+e x p ( X0
iδ)]. The error terms wWi, ˘ wNWi,w U|NWi,w I|NWi follow
type I extreme value distributions. wWi is independent from ˘ wNWi, and wU|NWi and wI|NWi are
independent between them. Only when λ =0 , ˘ wNWi is not correlated with wU|NWi y wI|NWi.
Deﬁning yji =1when individual i chooses option j = W ,N W ,U ,I and zero otherwise, we have:
PW =P r [ yWi =1 ]=
exp(X0α)
exp(X0α)+e x p ( X0β + λV )
PU|NW =P r [ yUi =1 |yNWi =1 ]=
exp(X0γ)
exp(X0γ)+e x p ( X0δ)
note that PNW =1− PW and PI|NW =1− PU|NW.
To identify the parameters of interest it is necessary to impose identifying restrictions. First,
all γ or δ must be equal to zero. And second, all β must be zero. Then the log-likelihood function









yjiln(Pj|NWi)=l o g ( L1)+l o g ( L2)
where L1 refers to likelihood with respect to W and NW, and L2 is the likelihood with respect
to the choice between U and I given NW. Afterwards, the nested model is estimated by maximum
likelihood. The signiﬁcance of ˆ λ is tested by means of a Wald test (see Table 12). For the three
tests ˆ λ is not diﬀerent from zero at standard signiﬁcance levels. As a results, the sequential logit
model is better than the multinomial one to study the transition processes.
22Table 12: Wald test for the parameter λ
ˆ λ p-value
W1 ,NO1 ,U1 ,I1 0.0369 0.1523
Given U1 =1:W2 ,NO2 ,U2 ,I2 0.0568 0.1884
Given I1 =1:W2 ,NO2 ,U2 ,I2 0.0606 0.1945
7.2 Forecast
In this section we test the in and out sample predictive accuracy of the sequential model against a
logit model for the probability of being working at t2. We deﬁne a binary variable that takes the
value one if the individual is working at t2 (559 observations) and zero otherwise (1.028 observa-
tions). We include the same explanatory variables than in the sequential model. The R2 is 0.5880
and the Gamma-Kruskal statistic 0.4368 (SE=0.021).We are going to use four criteria to guarantee
the robustness of the results: (a) R2 of McKelvey and Zavonia [30]; (b) Gamma-Kruskal statistic;
(c) number of predicted workers or percentage of correct forecasts (d) out of sample predictive
accuracy.
First, we observe that the R2 for any of the regressions of the sequential model is higher than
for the alternative logit speciﬁcation. Second, the Gamma-Kruskal statistic is nearer to 1 for any
regression in Table B.4 and, in particular, for W1,U 1W2 and I1W2. This implies that there is
a higher degree of concordance between the actual and the predicted number of people working.
Third, we study the percentage of correct predictions. For this propose, we generate predicted
probabilities, ˆ pM
i ;M = S,L where S or L denotes either sequential or logit model. We deﬁne the
following assignment rule:
Wi =1 if ˆ pM
i > P
where P = 559/1587 is the sample mean for the total number of working people at t2. Table 13
(PANEL A) presents the results of the analysis. The number of correct predictions is much closer
to the observed number of working people at t2 for the sequential model than it is for the logit one.
This evidence holds for the whole sample as well as for each interval.
Finally, we evaluate the “out of sample” predictive capacity. For example, we eliminate those
for which health shock happened more than two years ago and for the remaining observations we
obtain the “out of sample” probability of being working at t2. From a sample of 1.587, the health
shock happened less than one year ago for 857, between 1 and 2 years for 440 and between 2
and 3 years for 290. So, we keep 1297 observations when dropping the latter group. Hence, we
compare the number of working individuals who suﬀered the shock more than 2 years ago and those
predicted by the model. The results of this exercise are shown in Table 13 (PANEL B).
The sequential model predicts substantially better than its alternative. Moreover, the simpler
logit model overpredicts always. Although these results are per se very signiﬁcant, we perform a
battery of tests for the hypothesis of equal predictive accuracy between both models ( Diebold and
Mariano [31]). For the Morgan-Granger-Newbold test (Morgan [32], Granger and Newbold [33]),
we have to check that the loss diﬀerential function is quadratic and the forecast errors have zero
mean, are gaussian and do not present serial correlation. For the Meese and Rogoﬀ [34] test we
require the same assumptions except that of gaussianity. Note that since we have a single cross-
section we cannot test for serial correlation. In Figure 10 we show density functions for standard
23Table 13: Forecasts: (sample 4)
Panel A. Forecasts: Sequential Logit and Logit for W2.
observation W2 ˆ pi =1 if Sequential Logit Logit for W2
0-3 years 1587 559 ˆ pi ≥ 559
1587 540 430
0-1 year 857 327 ˆ pi ≥ 327
857 317 242
1-2 years 440 138 ˆ pi ≥ 138
440 133 115
2-3 years 290 94 ˆ pi ≥ 94
290 90 80
Panel B. “Out of sample” forecasts of the number of working people in t2 (sample 4)
Sequential Logit Logit for W2 Sample
% Desv. % Desv. %
*0-1 years 37.56 -1.57 41.05 7.57 38.16
*1-2 years 33.80 4.29 38.67 19.32 32.41
*2-3 years 29.74 -5.17 35.23 12.34 31.36
PANEL C. Forecast accuracy tests (sample 4)
All sample Out-of-sample forecast
forecast (0-1 year) (1-2 years) (2-3 years)
test Stat p-value Stat p-value test p-value Stat p-value
Asymptotic test -53.21 .0000 -2.341 .0010 -2.713 .0330 -2.681 .0037
Sign test -34.13 .0000 -2.221 .0132 -2.194 .0141 -2.704 .0034
Wilcoxon-ranked sign -37.96 .0000 -2.957 .0016 -3.734 .0001 -3.332 .0004
Morgan-Granger-Newbold -3.114 .0009 -17.29 .0000 -8.705 .0000 -12.77 .0000
Meese-Rogoﬀ 3.555 .0002 -9.314 .0000 -2.491 .0064 -3.901 .0001
All the test follow a N(0,1), except the Morgan-Granger-Newbold test that follows a t-student.
24errors corresponding to both models and the loss diﬀerential function. As it can be seen, all the
assumptions are satisﬁe df o rt h ew h o l es a m p l ea sw e l la sa l lt h e“ o u to fs a m p l e ”f o r e c a s t sw eh a v e
performed.
In Table 13 (PANEL C) we show statistics and p-values for ﬁve diﬀerent tests. For any standard
signiﬁcance level, all tests reject the null hypothesis of equal forecast accuracy between both models.
Hence, at the light of all statistical evidence, we can conclude that the sequential logit model is
substantially better than the alternative one.
8 Concluding remarks and tentative policy implications
In this paper we study older workers’ labor force transitions after a health/disability shock using
Spanish data. We propose a sequential logit model for the estimation of transitions using the
DDHSS carried out by the INE in 1999. The model as well as its forecasting power are validated
against a multinomial alternative.
Several interesting conclusions regarding the eﬀect of disability variables arise from the analysis.
Not surprisingly, we ﬁnd that the probability of keeping work decreases with both age and the
severity of the shock. More importantly, these eﬀect are not observed for younger workers. There
are notorious discrepancies in the marginal eﬀect on the probability of keeping work by type of
d i s a b i l i t y .W eh a v ee v a l u a t e dt h ej o i n te ﬀect for all disability variables by means of the deserving
indicator. In this sense, if the individual deserves a disability pension her probability of keeping
w o r ko rr e t u r n i n gt ow o r ka f t e rap e r i o do fi n a c t i v i t yf a l l st oz e r o .
We also ﬁnd, ﬁrst, that the probability of returning to job or ﬁn d i n gan e wo n ea f t e rah e a l t h
shock is very low and it decreases with age; and, second, there is great inertia to remain in the same
situation of inactivity or unemployment. In other words, social beneﬁts are so generous as to imply
little incentives to go back to work after a shock. In fact, the percentage of people who receive
a permanent disability beneﬁt but do not deserve it increases with age, (see Jiménez-Martín et al
[19]); and those who remain unemployed usually receive UB52+ beneﬁtu n t i lt h ee a r l yr e t i r e m e n t
beneﬁts are ﬁrst available. In this sense, it could be convenient to achieve ﬁscal neutrality concerning
employment, disability and unemployment beneﬁts, in order to incentive transitions to work.
Regarding the eﬀect of demographics our results are in line with recent literature (see, for
example, Jiménez-Martín et al. [18] and Riphahn [10]). Being female or having a retired spouse
or collecting DB reduces both the probability of keeping work and the probability of returning to
work after inactivity. On the contrary, both probabilities increase as the level of education or skill
increase. The eﬀects of other demographics such as married and spouse working are contradictory
because they decrease the probability of keeping work but increase the probability of returning to
work after a period of inactivity. However, our evaluation of the whole probability of being working
at period t2 evidences that their total eﬀect is positive.
Note that the strong total eﬀect of spouse working implies substantial complementarities in
leisure of both members of the couple. Apart from this, being female reduces signiﬁcantly the
probability of observing a transition, specially in the case of transitions back to work. This may
constitute evidence of gender discrimination.
Jointly, all the above facts may indicate that social employment promotion measures for (re-
coverable) temporary disability workers are not as eﬀective as they should be, because the relative
generosity of disability or retirement beneﬁts eases transitions to inactivity, even for those suﬀering
moderate disability shocks. Our data reveal that only 1.21 % of the agents who have returned to
work have beneﬁted from some of these measures.
According to data from the Ministry of Labor and Social Issues, most eﬀorts are concentrated
25in sheltered centers in which more than 70% of the workers suﬀer permanent disabilities. However,
there are other alternatives such as apprenticeship contracts, subsidies for becoming self-employer,
and for those unemployed receiving the UB52+ subsidy there exist a speciﬁc contract in which the
employer and the Social Security share the payment of the subsidy at 50% in case of indeﬁnite
contracts, and the company receives ﬁscal beneﬁts.
Despite these orientations, the concept of rehabilitation of people who become ill or disabled
is often organized in medico-pedagogical institutions and the process is reduced to a functional
limitation programme. Social and professional aspects take a minor role. For example, work and
housing adaptation are seldom taken into account, and architectural and other forms of barriers
are eliminated with diﬃculties.
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28A Description of the variables
Disabilities
For the descriptive analysis we have deﬁned a binary indicator for each one of the 36 disabilities
detailed in the Disabilities and Deﬁciencies Questionnaire, that is, a variable that takes the value
one if the respondent declares to suﬀer this disability and the value zero in other case. For the
estimation of the sequential logit model, we have grouped the 36 disabilities in the following 10
groups and have deﬁned a binary variable for each one.
1. Seeing: Receiving any image, Global visual tasks, Detailed visual tasks, Other visual disabil-
ities
2. Hearing: Hearing any sound, Hearing strong sounds, Listening the speech
3. Communicating: Communicating through speech, Communicating through alternative lan-
guage, Communicating through not sealed gestures, Communicating through conventional
writing - reading
4. Learning, applying knowledge and developing topics: Recognizing persons/objects and being
orientated in space and in time, Remembering information and recent or past episodes, Deal-
ing and executing simple orders and/or doing simple tasks, Dealing and executing complex
orders and/or doing complex tasks
5. Moving: Changes and maintenance of body positions, Getting up and down and standing up,
Moving inside home
6. Using arms and hands: Moving/transporting not very heavy objects, Using utensils and tools,
Manipulating small objects with hands and ﬁngers
7. Moving out of home: Moving without way of transport, Moving in public transport, Driving
own vehicle
8. Looking after oneself: Washing oneself, Controlling physical needs, Dressing and undressing,
Eating and drinking
9. Doing housework: Do the shopping, Cooking, Washing and ironing clothes, Cleaning the
house, Looking after the well-being of the family
10. Relating to people: Supporting relations of fondness with close relatives, Doing friends, Re-
lating to companions, chiefs and subordinates
29Socioeconomic variables
Married 1 if he/she is married
Spouse working 1 if spouse is working
Spouse retired/DB 1 if spouse is retired or receiving disability beneﬁt
Breadwinner 1 if he/she is the household main sustainer
Health variables
Caretaker 1 if he/she needs somebody to take care of him/her
Technical aid 1 if he/she needs any kind of device to do the activity
Impairment certiﬁcate 1 if he/she has received an impairment certiﬁcate
Rehabilitation treatment 1 if he/she has ﬁnished a rehabilitation treatment
Change of house 1 if he/she has moved because of a disability
Education
No schooling (omitted category)
Elementary 1 if he/she has only ﬁnished elementary education
High School 1 if he/she has only ﬁnished high school or vocational training
College 1 if he/she is a graduate or bachelor
Skill level of the job previous to the shock
Unskilled (omitted category )
Skilled 1 if he/she is a qualiﬁed worker in agriculture, cattle raising,
ﬁshing, industry, mining industry, construction, services
White collar 1 if management, public administration, white collars,
white collar workers and intellectuals
BT a b l e s
Table B.1. Mean values of variables (%) (sample 4)
W1 U1 I1 U1W2 U1 U2 U1I2 I1W2 I1 U2 I1I2
Man 70.32 61.40 67.30 100 61.11 52.94 88.89 37.5 67.17
Married 81.55 71.93 78.31 100 69.44 70.59 83.33 50 78.42
Spouse working 45.21 32.12 39.23 70 55.37 18.11 65.39 43.51 23.25
Spouse retired/DB 2.68 27.45 33.38 14 10.38 60.45 17.27 11.84 54.10
Main breadwinner 76.67 59.65 69.10 75 61.11 52.94 88.89 25 69.10
Impairment certiﬁcate 18.26 19.30 40.02 25 16.67 23.53 61.11 25 39.80
Change of house 1.85 8.77 6.24 25 5.56 11.76 5.56 12.5 6.88
Rehabilitation treatment 17.12 35.09 29.42 0 38.89 35.29 33.33 50 29.22
Elementary 47.66 47.37 46.95 50 44.44 52.94 50 25 40.81
High School 16.75 17.54 10.93 0 19.44 17.65 16.67 25 10.75
College 8.87 3.51 5.18 0 5.56 0 11.11 12.5 5.04
White collar 25.37 3.51 10.44 25 2.78 0 16.67 25 10.24
Skilled 62.44 52.63 46.84 50 47.22 67.41 66.67 62.5 46.43
[50,55] 33.50 40.35 21.28 50 44.44 29.41 55.56 50 20.57
(55,60] 36.21 33.33 30.48 25 36.11 29.41 22.22 37.5 30.56
(60,65] 30.29 26.32 48.23 25 19.44 41.18 22.22 12.5 48.87
Technical aid 22.29 24.56 27.03 25 25 23.53 22.22 25 27.12
Caretaker 17.86 24.56 46.01 25 19.44 35.29 22.22 25 46.52
Severe disability 1.97 10.53 24.19 25 11.11 11.76 11.11 12.50 24.03
Very severe disability 44.83 57.89 66.72 50 55.56 64.71 33.33 75 67.17
Deserving indicator 51.32 55.87 85.53 56.68 64.59 64.59 50.17 82.98 92.59
30Table B.2. Description of very severe disabilities (%) (sample 4).
W1 U1 I1 U1W2 U1U2 U1I2 I1W2 I1U2 I1I2
Seeing any image 2.75 0 1.35 0 0 0 0 0 1.38
Global visual tasks 13.19 12.12 10.34 0 10 18.18 0 16.67 10.38
Detailed visual tasks 14.01 15.15 11.33 50 10 18.18 0 33.33 11.25
Other visual disabilities 6.32 3.03 4.31 0 5 0 0 0 4.38
Hearing any sound 8.52 6.06 0.86 0 10 0 0 0 0.88
Hearing strong sounds 3.85 0 1.23 0 0 0 0 0 1.25
Listening the speech 14.29 9.09 5.30 0 10 9.09 0 0 5.38
Communicating through speech 6.32 3.03 3.82 0 5 0 0 0 3.88
Comm. alternative languages 0.55 0 0.86 0 0 0 0 0 0.88
Comm. not sealed gestures 0.55 0 0.99 0 0 0 0 0 1
Comm. reading-writing 2.47 3.03 7.14 0 0 9.09 0 0 7.25
Recognizing people 0.27 3.03 2.22 0 0 9.09 0 0 2.25
Remembering information 1.10 3.03 4.31 0 0 9.09 0 0 4.38
Executing simple orders 0.27 0 2.22 0 0 0 0 0 2.25
Executing complex orders 0.82 3.03 4.80 0 0 9.09 0 0 4.88
Maintaining body postures 10.16 6.06 17.49 0 0 18.18 33.33 33.33 17.25
Getting up and down 16.76 24.24 25.62 50 20 27.27 33.33 33.33 25.5
Moving inside home 7.42 12.12 14.90 0 15 9.09 0 0 15.13
Moving not heavy objects 19.51 18.18 34.24 0 10 36.36 0 0 34.38
Using utensils and tools 14.56 18.18 25.37 0 15 27.27 0 0 25.5
Manipulating small objects 13.19 15.15 16.87 0 15 18.18 0 0 16.88
Moving without transport 16.21 24.24 32.76 0 20 36.36 0 16.67 33.13
Moving using public transport 15.38 27.27 31.28 50 20 36.36 0 0 31.63
Driving own vehicle 35.99 39.39 49.63 50 35 45.45 0 0 50
Washing oneself 3.02 12.12 12.93 50 5 18.18 16.67 0 13
Controlling physical needs 1.37 0 4.68 0 0 0 0 0 4.75
Dressing and undressing 4.40 9.09 12.56 0 5 18.18 16.67 0 12.63
Eating and drinking 0.27 3.03 3.08 0 5 0 0 0 3.13
Do the shopping 11.26 15.15 31.65 50 5 27.27 16.67 16.67 31.88
Cooking 5.22 6.06 20.07 0 0 18.18 0 0 20.38
Washing and ironing clothes 8.24 6.06 27.22 0 10 18.18 0 0 27.50
Cleaning the house 12.36 18.18 34.61 0 10 36.36 0 0 34.88
Looking after the family 5.22 3.03 20.81 0 0 9.09 0 0 21.13
Relations with family 0.55 3.03 2.83 0 5 0 0 0 2.88
Making friends 3.30 6.06 8.74 0 5 9.09 0 16.67 8.75
Relating at work 6.59 12.12 11.95 50 10 9.09 16.67 16.67 11.88
Table B.3. Fraction of sample by combinations of severity and forecast by transition.
W1 U1 I2 U1 W1 U1 U2 U1 I2 I1 W2 I1 U2 I1 I2
S1F1 0.12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S1F2 0.12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S1F3 2.96 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S1F4 0.12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S1F5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S2F1 3.20 0 1.23 0 0 0 0 0 1.26
S2F2 5.42 3.51 2.88 0 5.56 0 5.56 0 2.85
S2F3 29.19 29.82 25.97 25 30.56 29.41 61.11 12.5 25.52
S2F4 29.43 17.54 33.03 25 16.67 17.65 11.11 25 33.42
S2F5 4.31 5.26 3.86 25 5.56 0 0.00 0 3.95
S3F1 0.37 0 0.99 0 0 0 0.00 0 1.01
S3F2 0.99 8.77 2.71 0 8.33 11.76 5.56 12.5 2.60
S3F3 14.29 15.79 17.83 25 13.89 17.65 22.22 12.5 17.80
S3F4 18.23 29.82 35.09 0 25 47.06 5.56 75 35.26
S3F5 2.71 3.51 3.04 0 2.78 5.88 0 0 3.11
S4F1 0 0 0.41 0 0 0 0 0 0.42
S4F2 0 1.75 1.48 0 2.78 0 0 0 1.43
S4F3 0 12.28 19.39 0 13.89 11.76 0 12.5 19.40
S4F4 0 10.53 15.26 0 8.33 17.65 0 12.5 15.53
S4F5 0 3.51 3.29 0 0 50 0 0 3.33
The variable severity takes one of four values (Si,i =1 ,..,4): without diﬃculty, moderate diﬃculty, severe
diﬃculty and can not do the activity. The variable forecast can take ﬁve diﬀerent values (Fj,j=1 ,..5): recoverable,
recoverable with restrictions, stable without perspectives of improvement, can go worse, and it is not possible to
determine.
31Table B.4. Marginal eﬀects for the sequential logit model (sample 4)
W1W2 U1 U1W2 U1U2 I1W2 I1U2
Baseline 0.8234 0.12459 0.1025 0.7099 0.0614 0.2512
Women -2.32∗∗ -3.48∗∗ -44.09∗∗ -52.75∗∗ -3.63∗∗
Married -3.67∗∗ -17.94∗∗ -29.92∗∗ 48.43∗∗ -28.40∗∗
Spouse working -2.65∗∗ 1.27∗∗ 30.52∗∗ 12.26∗∗ 47.70∗∗ 11.41∗∗
Spouse retired/DB -12.72∗∗ -1.08∗∗ -44.80∗∗ -31.81∗∗ -58.77∗∗ -33.6’∗∗
Main breadwinner 10.33∗∗ -41.09∗∗ -17.50∗∗ 119.73∗∗ -87.22∗∗
Impairment certiﬁcate -13.55∗∗ -64.67∗∗ -76.01∗∗ -14.15∗∗ -44.10∗∗ -47.89∗∗
Change of house -17.49∗∗ -44.22∗∗ -74.23∗∗ -37.30∗∗ -48.47∗∗ -41.29∗∗
Rehabilitation treatment -6.67∗∗ 39.19∗∗ 20.95∗∗ 8.62∗∗ 95.78∗∗
Age (55,60] -3.75∗∗ -35.31∗∗ -33.04∗∗ -8.95∗ -33.72∗∗ -8.89∗∗
Age (60,65] -16.67∗∗ -61.28∗∗ -65.45∗∗ -48.33∗∗ -40.68∗∗ -56.58∗∗
No Elementary -17.89 30.40 -15.65 31.98 14.85 3.41
Elementary -2.41∗∗ 24.70∗∗ -3.38∗∗ 16.84∗∗ 12.12∗∗ 25.64∗∗
College 4.41∗∗ -11.66∗∗ -4.42∗∗ -9.94∗∗
Unskilled -31.65 17.57 -21.10 21.67 -61.77 2.53
White collar 9.99∗∗ -28.12∗∗ 12.43∗ 83.51∗∗ -7.57∗
Severe disability -4.55∗∗ -35.27∗∗ -66.77∗∗ -10.84∗∗ -3.78∗ -55.72∗∗
Very severe disability -19.33∗∗ -65.10∗ -93.28∗∗ -22.15∗∗ -46.21∗∗ -84.75∗∗
Deserving indicator -46.14∗∗ -80.22∗∗ -95.57∗∗ -59.56∗∗ -87.43∗∗ -92.65∗∗
Technical aid -1.67∗∗ -9.80∗∗ -10.75∗∗ -21.86∗∗ -54.90∗∗
Caretaker -9.24∗∗ -59.72∗∗ -38.98∗∗ -45.64∗∗
Disability for:
Seeing -15.60∗∗ -22.25∗∗ -49.61∗∗ -62.23∗∗ -70.12∗∗
Hearing -7.55∗∗ -40.33∗∗ -60.29∗∗
Communicating -9.62∗∗ -30.32∗∗ -55.17∗∗
Remembering —3.79∗∗ -17.23∗∗
Executing orders -24.14∗∗ -20.05∗∗
Maintaining body postures -2.77∗∗ 30.41∗∗ 22.06∗ 27.93∗∗ -0.84∗∗ -73.54∗∗
Using hands and ﬁngers -3.11∗∗ 58.77∗∗ 30.16∗∗ -15.22∗∗ 88.77∗∗
Moving outside home -27.53∗∗ 62.33∗∗ 15.08∗∗ -90.66∗∗ 79.84∗∗
Taking care of oneself -18.32∗∗ -38.97∗∗ -32.55∗∗ -38.60∗ -62.87∗∗
Doing housework -16.59∗∗ 31.79∗∗ 23.49∗∗ -52.20∗∗ 90.28∗∗
Relating -16.42∗∗ -32.70∗∗ -26.34∗ -42.94∗∗ -54.94∗∗
Log likelihood -1129.1091 -210.1244 -10.6383 -28.90736 -79.5386 -36.8550
R2 (1) 0.7945 0.5891 0.6891 0.7685 0.5539 0.6723
Gamma-Kruskal(2) 0.8146 0.6994 0.8472 0.6764 0.8780 0.7651
(0.019) (0.181) (0.014) (0.163) (0.088) (0.163)
∗∗ and ∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 1 and 5 %, respectively.
Baseline: male, single, high school education, skilled occupation, aged 50—54, moderate disability.
(1): R2 McKelvey and Zavoina adjusted r-squared
(2): Goodman-Kruskal’s Gamma statistics, asymptotic standard error within brackets
Table B.5. Probability of working at t2 and marginal eﬀects (sample 4).
P[W2 ] M.E. t P[W2 ] M.E t
Baseline 0.810 – –
Woman 0.726 -0.106 -3.47 Very severe disability -0.285 -4.12
Married 0.924 0.140 3.45 Deserving indicator 0.539 -0.335 -3.98
Spouse working 0.912 0.126 2.67 Technical aid 0.764 -0.056 -2.93
Spouse retired/DB 0.620 -0.235 -3.45 Caretaker 0.588 -0.274 -3.12
Main breadwinner 0.970 0.198 2.57 Disability for:
Impairment certiﬁcate 0.640 -0.210 -2.40 Seeing 0.621 -0.234 -4.05
Change of house 0.741 -0.086 -4.51 Hearing 0.689 -0.149 -3.58
Rehabilitation treatment 0.712 -0.121 -7.25 Communicating 0.578 -0.286 -3.73
No elementary 0.685 -0.155 -2.84 Remembering 0.538 -0.336 -3.90
Elementary 0.784 -0.032 -3.81 Executing orders 0.608 -0.249 -4.91
College 0.824 0.0171 3.22 Maintaining body postures 0.672 -0.170 -4.70
Unskilled 0.564 -0.306 -3.12 Using hands and ﬁngers 0.651 -0.196 -4.85
White collar 0.947 0.169 4.04 Moving outside home 0.659 -0.187 -4.86
Age (55,60] 0.733 -0.095 -2.89 Taking care of oneself 0.579 -0.285 -4.77
Age (60,65] 0.647 -0.202 -2.71 Doing housework 0.638 -0.212 -4.89
Severe disability 0.692 -0.146 -3.15 Relating 0.667 -0.177 -4.92
Baseline: male, single, high school education, skilled occupation, aged 50—54, moderate disability.
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34Figure 10. Density functions for standard errors and loss function for the estimated models
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